

Indonesia's Political Shifts: From Opposition to Coalition in 2014–2024 Elections

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Abstract

This paper explores the evolving trajectory of political alignments in Indonesia's presidential elections between 2014 and 2024, focusing on the strategic transformation of political parties from opposition to coalition. Drawing on William H. Riker's Minimal Winning Coalition theory, it argues that party behavior is shaped not only by electoral calculus but also by the broader objective of maintaining systemic stability. While Riker emphasizes efficiency through minimal coalitions, Indonesian coalitions are often expansive, serving as tools for mitigating political volatility rather than maximizing efficiency. Through a descriptive-analytical method based on secondary literature, this research finds that coalitions in Indonesia prioritize inclusive governance, often at the cost of a weakened opposition. Notable examples include the integration of PAN into Jokowi's administration in 2015 and Gerindra's cabinet entry after 2019. While this approach supports continuity and governance stability, it also raises concerns about the dilution of critical oversight. Ultimately, the study underscores how Indonesian coalitional politics reflect a pragmatic balance between power consolidation and democratic legitimacy.

Keywords: opposition, coalition, presidential election, Indonesia, minimal winning coalition

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INTRODUCTION

In Indonesian politics, the phenomenon of political parties shifting from the opposition to the ruling coalition has created dynamics that reflect flexibility and a pragmatic orientation in political decision-making within a multiparty democratic system. During the presidential election period from 2014 to 2024, opposition parties that initially positioned themselves against the government tended to gravitate toward and eventually join the ruling coalition. For instance, after the 2014 presidential election, the National Mandate Party (PAN), which had previously supported Prabowo Subianto, eventually joined Joko Widodo's administration in 2015 (Ayatollah, 2015). Similarly, following the 2019 presidential election, the Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra), which had initially been in opposition, ultimately opted to enter the cabinet, with Prabowo himself assuming the role of Minister of Defense (Abdul Jalil, 2019).

This phenomenon marks an unusual pattern compared to countries with a stable opposition (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1994), such as the United States (Polsby, 1997), the United Kingdom (Johnson, 1997), and Germany (Hohendorf et al., 2020), where opposition parties generally remain outside the government and consistently perform their oversight function. Pragmatism in this context refers to the tendency of political

parties to adjust their political stance to gain strategic advantages, whether in the form of access to government resources or increased political influence. This shift raises questions about the underlying reasons for parties' decisions to change positions and how this affects the balance of power as well as the opposition's ability to uphold government accountability. This phenomenon also illustrates that Indonesian politics tends to prioritize large and stable coalitions rather than a strict division of opposition roles, making it a crucial issue for further examination in the context of contemporary Indonesian politics.

Scholars have observed and analyzed coalition and opposition dynamics in various political contexts worldwide. For example, research by Gandhi and Ong reveals that opposition coalition formation in authoritarian regimes, such as in Malaysia, serves as a key strategy toward democratization, although it requires cross-party support that is difficult to achieve due to differing interests and the repressive risks posed by the ruling power (Gandhi & Ong, 2019). In Africa, as seen in the cases of Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Uganda, Beardsworth found that pre-election coalition formation often fails due to conflicting interests influenced by ethnicity and dependence on external funding, which ultimately weakens opposition cohesion (Beardsworth, 2018). In Malaysia, Nur Atika Bt Hairi explains that the Pakatan Rakyat coalition (2008–2016) demonstrated relative stability despite ideological differences; however, religious issues, such as the implementation of hudud laws, became the primary catalyst for the coalition's fragmentation (Hairi, 2017). Similarly, studies in Botswana reveal a comparable pattern, where the opposition struggles to establish a stable coalition due to an unclear model of cooperation, allowing the ruling party to maintain its dominance (Sebudubudu et al., 2016). In the parliamentary context, Hix and Noury observe that coalition and opposition dynamics are driven more by institutional structures than by ideological differences, as seen in presidential systems with coalition governments or parliamentary minorities, which facilitate issue-based coalitions (Hix & Noury, 2016).

Previous studies indicate that the dynamics of opposition coalitions in various countries tend to emerge as a response to political conditions that differ from those in Indonesia. In many countries with authoritarian systems or single-party dominance, opposition coalitions are formed as strategic alliances to challenge centralized power. Meanwhile, in developing democracies such as Malaysia and several African countries, tensions within coalitions are often driven by strong ideological differences or ethnic factors, ultimately disrupting the stability of these alliances. Additionally, Riker's Minimal Winning Coalition Theory, which generally emphasizes forming small coalitions for maximum efficiency and benefit, has not been fully explored in the context of a multiparty democracy like Indonesia, where forming large coalitions is considered essential for maintaining political stability. Given Indonesia's distinct political structure and the complexity of its local political landscape, this context provides new opportunities for analyzing the shift from opposition to coalition participation in the presidential elections held between 2014 and 2024.

Based on the above explanation, this shift raises questions regarding how opposition dynamics evolved into coalition participation during Indonesia's 2014–2024 presidential elections. Furthermore, the Minimal Winning Coalition Theory proposed by William H. Riker suggests that political actors tend to form coalitions with the smallest number of members sufficient to secure power (William H. Riker, 1962). However, in Indonesian political practice, coalitions tend to be broader and include multiple parties. Therefore, this study

seeks to address how Riker's Minimal Winning Coalition Theory can be applied in the Indonesian context and whether the coalitions formed are primarily based on the minimal requirement for maximizing political advantages or rather on efforts to establish long-term political stability. By raising and addressing these questions, this research aims to provide new insights into coalition and opposition strategies within multiparty democracy and a direct presidential system like Indonesia's.

Methodologically, this study employs a literature review and qualitative research with a descriptive-analytical approach to explore the phenomenon of opposition-to-coalition shifts in the context of Indonesia's presidential elections from 2014 to 2024. The choice of a literature review is based on the study's focus on analyzing the pattern of opposition-to-coalition shifts using documented theories and historical data, while the qualitative research approach is selected to provide an in-depth explanation of political dynamics by emphasizing the interpretation of observed phenomena. This study utilizes secondary data obtained from various sources, including academic journals, books, news articles, and previous studies on coalition and opposition dynamics in other countries for comparative analysis, as introduced in the research's introduction section.

The theory employed in this study is William H. Riker's Minimal Winning Coalition Theory. This theory suggests that political actors tend to form the smallest possible coalition that still meets the requirements for securing effective power, thereby avoiding additional members who could increase complexity and reduce coalition efficiency (William H. Riker, 1962). This theory is chosen because it provides a useful conceptual framework for understanding coalition formation patterns in Indonesia, particularly within its dynamic multiparty democratic landscape. The implementation of this theory in the study is carried out by analyzing the patterns of coalition formation and transformation observed in three Indonesian presidential elections—2014, 2019, and 2024. The focus is to determine whether the shift from opposition to coalition follows an efficient minimal pattern or is primarily aimed at fostering political stability within a multiparty context. The collected data is then processed descriptively to illustrate the phenomenon and analyzed analytically to understand how Riker's theory is applied within Indonesia's political dynamics.

DISCUSSION

The Development of Opposition and Coalition in Indonesia

The terms "opposition" and "coalition" in Indonesian politics are inseparable from the political dynamics that have evolved since the early days of independence. During the Old Order era (1945–1966), Indonesia implemented a parliamentary system that allowed political parties such as the Indonesian National Party (PNI: Partai Nasional Indonesia), Masyumi, and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) to form coalitions in parliament, either to support or oppose government policies led by the prime minister, who was accountable to President Soekarno (Siregar, 2011). In this context, Indonesia once had the position of prime minister, which began with the formation of the First Sjahrir Cabinet under the leadership of Sutan Sjahrir on November 14, 1945 (Padiatra et al., 2023). This prime ministerial era ended on July 10, 1959, coinciding with the dissolution of the Djuanda Cabinet, led by Djuanda Kartawidjaja, following the issuance of the Presidential Decree of July

5, 1959 (Verelladevanka Adryamarthanino, 2022). Politics during this period was highly dynamic and often marked by conflicts, as numerous parties competed for influence in parliament. However, the concept of opposition at that time was not formally defined as it is understood in contemporary democratic systems.

In the context of the Old Order, political parties dissatisfied with government policies typically withdrew their support from the existing coalition and chose to act as the opposition. However, such opposition was temporary and largely based on political calculations rather than strong ideological commitments, depending on the prevailing political dynamics (Pramudya, 2024). This differs from modern democratic systems, where the opposition plays a structured role in maintaining checks and balances on government power. For instance, in the early 1950s, the coalition between PNI and Masyumi, which formed the government, eventually collapsed due to differences in economic and ideological policies (Haris, 2014). This division led to shifts in coalition compositions and government structures, yet the concept of opposition at that time was not institutionalized within the political system. The political developments of this period were also influenced by the Presidential Decree of July 5, 1959, in which President Soekarno abolished the parliamentary system and reinstated a presidential system (Nugroho, 2019). This decision drastically altered the dynamics of opposition and coalition politics. After the decree, executive power became concentrated in the hands of the President, leading to a diminished role for political parties in parliament (Ferry Irawan Febriansyah & Yogi Prasetyi, 2021). As a result of these changes, the opposition weakened, and coalitions were primarily formed as a means of political compromise to support Soekarno's policies rather than as an effective mechanism for political oversight. Ultimately, scholars have observed that the Old Order era was characterized by fluid political dynamics, where opposition and coalition arrangements were highly flexible and continuously shifted based on the needs and interests of the involved political parties.

During the New Order era (1966–1998) under President Soeharto, the concept of formal opposition was nearly nonexistent. The New Order government implemented a centralized and authoritarian political system, imposing strict restrictions on political parties and opposition groups (Farchan, 2022). Only three political parties were allowed to participate in elections: Golongan Karya (Golkar), the United Development Party (PPP: Partai Persatuan Pembangunan), and the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI: Partai Demokrasi Indonesia) (Ibrahim, 2024). Golkar, which effectively served as the government's political vehicle, dominated Indonesian politics for more than three decades (Noventari, 2016). During this period, political opposition faced severe repression. Any form of resistance against the government was deemed a threat to national stability and was forcefully suppressed by state apparatuses. Meanwhile, coalitions during the New Order were more functional in nature, where political parties and groups were compelled to cooperate with the government under the tight control of Soeharto and the military. There was no space for political parties to form formal coalitions that could challenge the government (Majid & Sugitanata, 2021).

The emergence of a more democratic multiparty system following the fall of the New Order in 1998 brought significant changes to Indonesian politics. In this new political system, opposition and coalition became essential elements of the democratic process (Peni Hanggarini, 2011). During the Reform Era, multiparty elections were regularly held, with various political parties competing for public votes. In this

period, the concept of opposition gained a more formal place within Indonesia's political system. Political parties that failed to secure a parliamentary majority typically chose to remain outside the government as the opposition, overseeing the administration and its policies. At the same time, parties that won the most parliamentary seats usually formed coalitions to establish a stable government (Haris, 2014).

The nature of political coalitions also underwent significant changes during this era. Political coalitions in Indonesia were no longer merely alliances between political parties but also represented a form of compromise to achieve political stability. An example of this was the formation of the Red and White Coalition (Koalisi Merah Putih, KMP) and the Great Indonesia Coalition (Koalisi Indonesia Hebat, KIH) following the 2014 presidential election. KMP, led by the Gerindra Party and Golkar Party, opted to remain outside the government and act as the opposition to President Joko Widodo's administration, which was supported by KIH, a coalition consisting of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP: Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan) and its allies (Romli, 2017).

Furthermore, in the context of contemporary Indonesian politics, opposition and coalition dynamics are often fluid and pragmatic. Nevertheless, both entities play a crucial role in maintaining a balance of power. The development of coalitions and opposition intensified particularly after the 2019 elections, which saw the formation of the Onward Indonesia Coalition (Koalisi Indonesia Maju) supporting President Joko Widodo and Ma'ruf Amin, as well as the Just and Prosperous Coalition (Koalisi Adil Makmur) backing Prabowo Subianto. These two coalitions represented opposing political poles in the presidential election contest (Gunanto et al., 2024). Thus, the historical development of opposition and coalition in Indonesia illustrates that these concepts have undergone significant evolution, from the Old Order to the Reform Era. Although they only became formally institutionalized in the post-Reform democratic era, the roots of opposition and coalition had already existed since the founding of Indonesia.

From Opposition to Coalition in the 2014 to 2024 Presidential Elections

The 2014 Presidential Election marked a significant turning point in Indonesia's political history. Jokowi, who was then serving as the Governor of Jakarta, faced off against Prabowo Subianto, a former general with a strong political base through the Gerindra Party (Zaman, 2022). This election was not merely a contest between two prominent figures but also a battle between two grand visions for Indonesia. Supported by a coalition of parties including the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP: Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan), the NasDem (Nasional Demokrat) Party, and the National Awakening Party (PKB: Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa), Jokowi campaigned on a platform emphasizing bureaucratic reform, infrastructure development, and social welfare (Fabian Januarius Kuwado, 2014). On the other hand, Prabowo, backed by the Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra: Gerakan Indonesia Raya) and supported by the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS: Partai Keadilan Sejahtera), the National Mandate Party (PAN: Partai Amanat Nasional), the United Development Party (PPP: Partai Persatuan Pembangunan), the Crescent Star Party (PBB: Partai Bulan Bintang), and Golkar, focused on national sovereignty and economic justice (Humas PKS, 2014).

The 2014 election campaign was highly intense, with each candidate striving to attract voters through various policy platforms. Prabowo underscored the importance of safeguarding economic sovereignty from foreign intervention, whereas Jokowi emphasized pragmatic development policies and efforts to combat corruption (Mietzner, 2014). Ultimately, Jokowi won the election with 53.15% of the vote, while Prabowo secured 46.85% (Dian Maharani, 2014). However, Prabowo's camp contested the results by filing a lawsuit with the Constitutional Court, although the challenge was ultimately dismissed (Tim detikcom, 2019).

The 2019 Presidential Election saw yet another contest between Jokowi and Prabowo. By this time, Jokowi was the incumbent president with a track record to showcase, particularly in massive infrastructure development, including the construction of toll roads, ports, and airports (Iswari Anggit Pramesti, 2019). Meanwhile, Prabowo remained in the opposition, criticizing Jokowi's policies, particularly concerning national debt and reliance on foreign investment (Chandra Gian Asmara & Ranny Virginia Utami, 2018). The 2019 election campaign was even more polarizing than in 2014, with religious and identity politics playing a more prominent role, fueled by narratives involving conservative elements within Indonesian society (Ronaldo & Darmaiza, 2021). Jokowi's coalition in 2019 consisted of PDIP, NasDem, PPP, PKB, PKPI, Hanura, and Golkar, while Prabowo's coalition remained supported by Gerindra, PAN, PKS, and the Democratic Party (Aristya Rahadian, 2018). Despite the heightened political tension, the election results showed a more decisive victory for Jokowi, who won with 55.5% of the vote, while Prabowo obtained 44.5% (Fitria Chusna Farisa, 2019). As in 2014, Prabowo once again contested the election results in the Constitutional Court, but his appeal was unsuccessful ("Flashback of 2014 and 2019 Presidential Election Dispute Decisions" 2024).

During the subsequent period, significant political changes took place following the 2019 Presidential Election. In a surprising turn of events, Prabowo Subianto accepted an offer to join Jokowi's cabinet as Minister of Defense. This decision was widely regarded as a pragmatic move for both parties. For Jokowi, bringing Prabowo into his administration ensured greater political stability by reducing the potential for strong opposition. Meanwhile, for Prabowo, the position of Minister of Defense provided an opportunity to remain relevant in national politics and even rebuild his political strength for future contests (Sukarno & Amurwani, 2020). Prabowo's decision to join Jokowi's administration marked the end of the sharp political polarization that had characterized their rivalry over two consecutive elections. Although many were initially skeptical, Prabowo successfully carried out his new role, focusing on the modernization of defense equipment and the enhancement of Indonesia's military capacity (Andi Firdaus, 2024). On the other hand, Jokowi also benefited from Prabowo's presence in his cabinet, as it further strengthened his administration's political base, which already spanned a broad political spectrum (Wahyu Putro A, 2019).

Furthermore, the 2024 Presidential Election became one of the most monumental political events in Indonesia's history. Prabowo Subianto, who had previously run for president twice (in 2014 and 2019), finally won the 2024 election with a significant victory. Alongside Gibran Rakabuming Raka, the son of President Joko Widodo, as his vice-presidential candidate, the pair garnered strong support from various segments of society, political parties, and national figures (Taslim Septia, 2024). Since serving as Minister of Defense in

Jokowi's cabinet since 2019, Prabowo had leveraged his strategic position to solidify his political base and build an image as a decisive leader committed to national security and sovereignty ("Best Performing Minister becomes Prabowo's Capital in Presidential Election 2024" 2023). With his extensive military and political experience, Prabowo offered a platform centered on stability, military modernization, and strengthening national defense, which appealed to a broad electorate (Emanuella B, 2024). Meanwhile, Gibran, who had been serving as the Mayor of Solo, had a strong reputation among young voters, providing a significant electoral advantage. As a dynamic young leader, Gibran brought fresh energy to millennial and Generation Z voters, who were increasingly engaged in the political process (Fath Putra Mulya, 2023). The combination of Prabowo's experience and Gibran's youthful dynamism was a key factor in their success in the 2024 election.

During the 2024 election campaign, Prabowo-Gibran faced several strong contenders, including Ganjar Pranowo from PDIP and Anies Baswedan, who ran with the support of an opposition coalition. The Ganjar and Anies coalitions reflected a more fluid political landscape, where parties with diverse backgrounds united to present an alternative to Prabowo-Gibran. Ganjar, backed by PDIP and other parties, emphasized the continuity of people-centered policies and bureaucratic reforms. Meanwhile, Anies, supported by opposition parties such as NasDem, PKS, and PKB, advocated for more significant policy changes, with a focus on greater transparency and improved governance accountability (Bambang Setiawan, 2023). However, the Prabowo-Gibran ticket's advantage was not solely based on the strength of their political machinery but also on their ability to merge narratives of change with promises of stability. Prabowo pledged to continue key policies from Jokowi's administration, particularly in infrastructure and defense, while also offering a more assertive approach to national sovereignty issues (Fitria Chusna Farisa, 2024).

The victory of Prabowo-Gibran became increasingly apparent after quick count results indicated that the pair had secured more than 50% of the national vote ("Quick Count Results: Prabowo-Gibran Pair Win Handsomely" 2024). The large coalition formed between the Gerindra Party, Golkar Party, and several other parties provided substantial support for this victory (Alinda Hardiantoro, 2024). Prabowo and Gibran managed to garner support not only from Gerindra's traditional voter base but also from young voters and regions that had previously been strongholds of PDIP (Trisha Husada, 2024). The official results from the General Elections Commission (KPU: Komisi Pemilihan Umum) later confirmed Prabowo-Gibran's victory by a significant margin, defeating their closest rivals, Anies-Muhaimin and Ganjar-Mahfud (Vitorio Mantalean, 2024). This triumph marked a significant shift in Indonesia's political landscape, as Prabowo, who had previously failed multiple times in presidential elections, finally achieved the highest position in government.

Several key factors contributed to the landslide victory of Prabowo and Gibran in the 2024 Presidential Election. First, Gibran's popularity as a young figure and the son of President Jokowi had a strong electoral impact. He was perceived as a continuation of Jokowi's leadership, which was development-oriented and focused on grassroots engagement. This appealed to many voters who sought continuity in infrastructure development policies initiated by Jokowi ("Who is Gibran Rakabuming Raka, Indonesia's youngest vice president?" 2024). Second, Prabowo's position as Minister of Defense for the past five years provided him with the opportunity to demonstrate his leadership as a strong and decisive figure in safeguarding national

sovereignty. His efforts in military modernization, increasing the defense budget, and implementing security sector reforms served as a political asset that strengthened public trust in his leadership. Prabowo's narrative emphasizing national sovereignty and security successfully mobilized support from various societal groups, particularly conservatives and nationalists ("Best-performing Minister becomes Prabowo's Capital in 2024 Presidential Election" 2023).

Furthermore, a solid political coalition played a crucial role in securing the victory. Gerindra, Golkar, PAN, and other allied parties effectively united their forces in support of Prabowo-Gibran, creating strong political backing across various electoral regions. These parties worked synergistically to maximize voter turnout in both urban and rural areas. The well-organized political machinery, coupled with an effective campaign strategy, enabled Prabowo-Gibran to dominate the vote count in almost all provinces ("List of Political Parties in Prabowo's Coalition that Officially Elected President" 2024).

The victory of Prabowo Subianto and Gibran Rakabuming Raka not only marked the culmination of Prabowo's long political journey but also ushered in a new era in Indonesian politics. With this historic win, Prabowo is expected to continue several national priority agendas initiated by Jokowi, particularly in infrastructure development and enhancing Indonesia's economic competitiveness on the global stage (Fitria Chusna Farisa, 2024). However, this victory also presents significant challenges, especially in meeting the high public expectations placed on the new administration (Ruby Rachmadina, 2024).

One of the key priorities of the Prabowo-Gibran administration is strengthening national defense, both in terms of military capabilities and national security. Prabowo has repeatedly emphasized the importance of modernizing Indonesia's primary weapon systems (Alutsista) and enhancing defense capacity to address external threats, particularly in the increasingly competitive Southeast Asian region. Furthermore, reforms in the defense sector also include improving military professionalism and developing more independent defense technologies (Khairul Fahmi, 2024). On the other hand, as Vice President, Gibran is expected to bring a more inclusive and socially-oriented perspective ("Who is Gibran Rakabuming Raka, Indonesia's youngest vice president?," 2024). As a young leader, Gibran has the potential to mobilize youth participation in national development and promote innovation across various sectors, particularly in technology, education, and the creative economy. His role in the government is anticipated to bridge the interests of the younger generation and strengthen commitment to more equitable and sustainable development.

Thus, Indonesia's political dynamics from 2014 to 2024 have demonstrated remarkable flexibility and adaptability. The intense rivalry between Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto, which dominated two consecutive presidential elections, ultimately reached a point of compromise with Prabowo joining Jokowi's cabinet as Minister of Defense in 2019. This decision marked the end of their prolonged political rivalry and paved the way for a strategic coalition that reinforced political stability in Indonesia. The victory of Prabowo alongside Gibran Rakabuming Raka in the 2024 Presidential Election represents the culmination of a long and complex political journey. With this victory, Prabowo, who had previously failed twice in presidential elections, finally secured the presidency with significant support. The political alliance between the older and

younger generations, facilitated through collaboration with Gibran, has established a strong foundation for the future administration.

The trajectory of Indonesia's political landscape from 2014 to 2024 illustrates its dynamic and fluid nature, reflecting the ability of political elites to adapt to shifting interests and contexts. From strong opposition to solid alliances, Indonesia's political sphere has continued to evolve in response to domestic and global challenges. The Prabowo-Gibran victory symbolizes a broader political transition, not only signifying a change in national leadership but also marking a new direction for Indonesia's economic development, defense, and security policies in navigating an increasingly complex future. The stability fostered by this political alliance, combining experience with a spirit of renewal, offers hope for a more inclusive and resilient national growth under the new administration.

An Analysis of William H. Riker's Minimal Winning Coalition Theory on the Shift from Opposition to Coalition in Indonesia's 2014 to 2024 Presidential Elections

A comprehensive analysis of coalition dynamics in the Indonesian Presidential Elections from 2014 to 2024, through the lens of William H. Riker's Coalition Theory, illustrates how rational political strategies and interests play a crucial role in alliance formation. The selection of this theory is based on its relevance in explaining how political parties form coalitions by considering efficiency and the probability of electoral success. Riker's Minimal Winning Coalition Theory provides a framework for understanding coalition patterns in Indonesia, particularly in the context of a dynamic multiparty democracy. However, this theory has been subject to debate since its initial introduction in 1962. The primary criticism of Riker's approach is that it is overly focused on mathematical logic and does not fully account for ideological factors and social dynamics that influence political decision-making (Robinson, 1963).

Nevertheless, this study reaffirms the relevance of Riker's Minimal Winning Coalition Theory in explaining the research findings. According to Riker, coalition formation is driven by the necessity of maximizing power with the smallest possible number of members required for success (William H. Riker, 1962). In the 2014 Presidential Election, the coalition supporting Joko Widodo (Jokowi) was composed of parties that backed bureaucratic reform and infrastructure development policies oriented toward social welfare (Fabian Januarius Kuwado, 2014). Meanwhile, Prabowo Subianto was supported by a coalition that emphasized national sovereignty and economic justice (Humas PKS, 2014). These contrasting visions reflected the interests of the parties in maintaining their constituencies, leading each candidate to choose allies who supported the overarching narrative they sought to present to the public.

During this period, Riker's Minimal Winning Coalition Theory was evident in Jokowi's strategy of maintaining a coalition that was just sufficient to secure victory. With the support of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), the National Democratic Party (NasDem), and the National Awakening Party (PKB), Jokowi's coalition had enough strength without expanding to a level that would increase political complexity (Fabian Januarius Kuwado, 2014). This approach allowed Jokowi's supporting coalition to remain effective and avoid potential ideological conflicts among its members. Conversely, Prabowo's coalition also

maintained a relatively small number of parties but remained solid in their shared vision of economic sovereignty (Humas PKS, 2014), aligning with Riker's theory of efficient coalitions for achieving political objectives.

In the 2019 Presidential Election, Jokowi expanded his coalition by incorporating Golkar and the United Development Party (PPP) (Aristya Rahadian, 2018). This move reflected an adaptation of coalition strategy to strengthen his political dominance, demonstrating an adjustment to the increasingly polarized political landscape, especially amid the rising influence of religious and identity-based issues. According to Riker, this coalition expansion was not merely aimed at gaining additional party support but also at securing political legitimacy and minimizing internal opposition that could undermine government stability (William H. Riker, 1962). With the backing of Golkar and PPP, Jokowi was able to maintain stability and counter strong criticism from Prabowo and his supporting parties.

The most significant change occurred after the 2019 Presidential Election when Prabowo joined Jokowi's cabinet as Minister of Defense (Sukarno & Amurwani, 2020). Riker's Coalition Formation Theory explains that this decision resulted from the necessity to achieve political stability by integrating the main opposition force into the government (William H. Riker, 1962). Prabowo, who had previously been a staunch opposition figure, joined Jokowi's administration to form a broad coalition, effectively reducing potential resistance to government policies (Wahyu Putro A, 2019). This strategy demonstrates the flexibility of coalitions in responding to political shifts and creating advantages for both sides: Jokowi secured greater political stability, while Prabowo remained relevant in the national political arena.

In the 2024 Presidential Election, the success of the Prabowo-Gibran ticket reflected a coalition formed by combining Prabowo's experience and influence with Gibran's popularity among young voters ("Best-performing Minister becomes Prabowo's Capital in 2024 Presidential Election" 2023; "Who is Gibran Rakabuming Raka, Indonesia's youngest vice president?" 2024). From Riker's perspective, the Prabowo-Gibran coalition, along with parties such as Gerindra and Golkar, constituted a minimal yet strong combination to achieve the required electoral majority. This was reinforced by Gibran's role in attracting millennial and Generation Z voters (Fath Putra Mulya, 2023), adding a fresh and dynamic electoral dimension to the coalition. This not only illustrates the effectiveness of coalition strategies as supported by Riker but also highlights the coalition's adaptability in responding to demographic shifts among voters. Overall, the coalitions formed from 2014 to 2024 reflect an adaptation consistent with Riker's coalition theory. Alliances that initially emerged as opposition forces later evolved into governing coalitions, demonstrating how Indonesia's political elites can adjust to changing political landscapes. Through the analysis of this theory, it becomes evident that coalitions serve not only as instruments for gaining power but also as mechanisms for maintaining political stability in the face of increasingly complex national and global challenges.

CONCLUSION

This study asserts that the dynamics of the opposition shifting into part of the coalition in the Indonesian Presidential Elections from 2014 to 2024 reflect an adaptive pattern and the pragmatism of political parties in

maintaining power stability. During this period, parties that initially positioned themselves in opposition, such as the National Mandate Party (PAN) and the Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra), opted to join the ruling coalition under President Joko Widodo after the elections, considering political advantages and influence within the government. This shift illustrates the tendency of political parties to prioritize forming broad coalitions for political stability rather than maintaining a strong opposition to serve as a counterbalance to power.

Applying William H. Riker's Minimal Winning Coalition Theory, this study reveals that this shift towards coalition-building was not merely aimed at gaining power through alliances with sufficient parties but also at ensuring stability by forming an effective minimal coalition without unnecessary complexity. In this context, the parties within Jokowi's coalition maintained just enough members to sustain governance while minimizing the risk of instability due to significant ideological differences. This indicates that the application of Riker's theory in Indonesian politics functions to create solid alliances with a minimal yet strong composition, while also taking into account the local political landscape. This study recommends that while broad coalitions contribute to political stability, strengthening the oversight role of parliament and other institutions is essential to maintaining governmental accountability and preventing the weakening of checks and balances on power.

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